Introduction
In examining the contours of the penal complex, lawyers, penologists and criminologists are often drawn to traditional 'real crime' (homicides, violent assaults, organised crime, sexual offences, requirements of mens rea and actus reus, and general defences) whilst ignoring regulatory offences which are often enforced by specialist agencies. They have tended to be preoccupied with the punitive regulation of the poor-a project closely tied to a police-prosecutionsprisons way of knowing-that focuses on 'crime in the streets' rather than 'crime in the suites' (Ashworth 2000; Braithwaite, 2003) . As Scott (2010) notes: '[L]egal professionals schooled largely in appellate decisions relating to indictable offences, but also a broader society and media, [are] interested and often obsessed with homicide, sexual offences, robbery and theft. Much of the teaching of criminal law in universities also shares this focus ' (p. 64) . The narrow exclusivity of this approach is a mistake because regulatory criminal law is becoming increasingly influential, not least because criminalisation is now more than ever viewed as a panacea for almost any social problem. More and more we are witnessing the increasing and extensive use of regulatory strategies by the Irish state. In areas such as competition law, environmental protection, health and safety law, and consumer and corporate affairs, there has been a move towards using criminalisation as the last-resort strategy when compliance through negotiation and monitoring has failed.
Distinctions have traditionally been drawn between regulatory crimes and ordinary crimes on the basis that the former are mala prohibita (prohibited wrongs) and the latter are mala in se (moral wrongs). Regulatory crimes, it was suggested, should be thought of in 'instrumental means-ends terms', as not embodying quasi-moral 'values such as 'justice, fairness, right, and wrong' (Lacey 2004, p. 145) They were viewed as a 'quasi administrative matter' that did not attract significant moral opprobrium or stigmatise those convicted (McAuley and McCutcheon 2000, p. 341) . It has also been argued that regulatory crimes are more likely to be victimless (or at least not have a readily identifiable victim). Thirdly, it is suggested that regulatory offences for the most part do not embody a punitive or sanctioning model of justice, preferring instead to favour compliance strategies.
The main argument of this chapter will be that understanding the differences between criminal and regulatory offences along these lines no longer makes sense, particularly given the changing nature and perception of security risks, and the emergence of more 'networked governance' strategies that employ civil, administrative and regulatory mechanisms alongside criminal law instruments.
This extended, somewhat fluid, institutional arrangement is very different from the traditional bifurcated representation of wrongs in either civil or criminal harms, two almost mutually exclusive formal processes with their own ways of knowing and handling conflicts. In The King v Kidman 1 Griffiths J explained the dichotomy as follows:
'In primitive societies there is no distinction in principle between criminal and civil actions. In more developed societies the redress of civil wrongs is in practice required to be sought by the party aggrieved, while in the case of violations of the law entailing penal consequences the proceedings are instituted in the name or on behalf of the sovereign authority.'
Unfortunately the latter conceptualisation remains in the ascendancy, as evident in many criminal law textbooks and syllabi. It is time to abandon traditional divisions of this kind which have so structured our thinking and teaching. The teaching of criminal law should be extended beyond a focus on a relatively narrow taxonomy of offences and contestable principles -such as subjective culpability -to incorporate regulatory criminal wrongdoing. Rather than being afforded exceptional or epiphenomenal status, its extensive use, infrastructural arrangements and modes of operation requires us to reconsider the purposes, principles and boundaries of criminal law, and how it is taught.
Public Protection
Our ordinary criminal justice system is founded on the notion that public protection and security are 'essential goods' that are necessary for our selfpreservation, well-being, and happiness. This is hardly contentious. Most people would agree that we need a system of justice that will enable us to flourish and go about our lives free from the threat of injury or harm (such as robberies, rapes, assaults, burglaries, etc). What is striking, however, is that the perception stills exists in Ireland that regulatory crime does not threaten our security in the same way that street crime does. This is a fallacy. Though it may appear more remote, more victimless and may often be less dramatic, misconduct in the banking and corporate sectors, in the workplace, in the environment, and in the distortion of competition in the market poses as much, if not more, of a threat to our everyday lives as ordinary crime (with the potential to impact on more people). Our security can be affected in a myriad of different ways by misconduct of this nature including, among other things, workplace injuries, loss of jobs, loss of reputation and the consequent devaluation of share prices and pension funds, threats to the environment, increased taxation, and increased costs for consumers. Habermas noted that our legal system needs to move away from 'personal references and towards system relations ' (2008, pp. 432-435) .
These include: 'protection from environmental destruction, protection from radiation poisoning or lethal genetic damage; and, in general, protection from the uncontrolled side effects of large technological operations, pharmaceutical products, scientific experimentation, and so forth' (Habermas, 2008, pp. 432-435 Ten years ago, it was estimated that Ireland was losing about €2 billion a year to white collar crime and that doesn't take into account the cost of the criminality in our banks prior to the collapse of the economy. In spite of the huge cost of fraud and corruption to taxpayers, this problem has never been, and still isn't, a high priority for the Government.
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Criminal law modules that continues to focus exclusively on crime in the street offences as the paradigm of criminal law perpetuate a narrow construction of security risks posed in society, and also fail to capture the increasing criminalisation of all kinds of regulatory wrongdoing.
Compliance and Sanctioning strategies
One of the principal difficulties with only teaching criminal law through a 'police-prosecutions-prisons' prism is that it assumes that sanctions are a point of first resort for all types of offending behaviour. Though such an assumption works well in relation to most serious ordinary crime, it does not properly capture the possibilities available in respect of regulatory wrongdoing where there is an emphasis on promoting an entrepreneurial spirit. Compliance rather than sanctioning techniques will often be called for in this setting. They are orientated towards persuasion and dialogue, and are designed to promote good working relationships (Hamilton 2010, p. 17; Lynch-Fannon 2010, p. 127; Macrory, 2008) . A sanctioning approach to all regulatory wrongdoing would, it is argued, have very negative consequences:
'…it undermines the coercive power of the criminal law, dilutes its expressive power, over-deters otherwise desirable business activities, conflates blameworthiness with imprisonment, creates incentives for prosecutors to abuse their powers, fuels an appetite for enhancing prison terms, increases social costs and punishes people for actions that in some instances are not even civil wrongs, let alone undertaken with the taint of moral wrongfulness.' (Gopalan 2010, p. 2)
It can also be argued that if the cost of imprisonment is the same for offenders with different earning capacities, imprisoning those with very high earning capacities is a waste of social capital, especially if the objectives of incarceration can be achieved through other means. (Gopalan 2010, p. 2) There is significant merit in the adoption of compliance strategies. The line between poor business decision-making and criminal activity is far from clear cut. Moreover, white collar crime is hard to detect because it often occurs in private, behind closed corporate doors. It is also the case that proof is difficult in these cases, and often resource intensive. It is for this reason that area of regulatory crime still, by and large, remains predominantly orientated towards a compliance model of enforcement (McGrath, 2015) . This is facilitated by a wide range of strategies that favour the employment of negotiation, consultation and persuasion, rather than an exclusively sanctioning approach that would potentially polarize the various parties involved. These strategies include audits, The enforcement strategies of enforcement agencies have been arrayed in a pyramidal approach to enforcement in which the object is to maintain as much enforcement activity as possible at the base of the pyramid.…This approach is said to be effective not only with businesses which are orientated to legal compliance, but also with the 'amoral calculators' for whom compliance becomes the least costly path when they know there is a credible threat of escalation to more stringent sanctions. (Scott 2010, p. 69) . These strategies are supported by a wide range of criminal sanctions available summarily and on indictment.
Durkheim neatly captures this expansion in criminalisation, juxtaposing it with the decline in severity in penal punishments:
'Seeing with what regularity repression seems weaker the further one goes in evolution, one might believe that the movement is destined to continue without end; in other words, that punishment is tending towards zero…For there is no reason to believe that human criminality must in its turn regress as have the penalties which punish it. Rather everything points to its gradual development; that the list of acts which are defined as crimes of this type will grow, and that their criminal character will be accentuated. Frauds and injustices, which yesterday left the public conscience almost indifferent, arouse it today and this insensitivity will become more acute with time.' (Durkheim 1992, pp. 46-47) The emergence of this regulatory criminal framework is significantly different from the unified monopolies of centralised control underpinning policing and prosecution in the modern State. Arguably these new techniques and strategies can be seen as part of a pattern of more, rather than less, governance, but taking 'decentred', 'at-a-distance' forms. Prior to the nineteenth century, the institution of local policing was heavily orientated towards the 'creation of an orderly environment, especially for trade and commerce' (Braithwaite 2005, pp. 13-14) .
It did not focus exclusively on offences against persons and property, but also included the regulation of 'customs, trade, highways, foodstuffs, health, labour standards, fire, forests and hunting, street life, migration and immigration communities' (Braithwaite 2000, p. 225) . Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the State very gradually began to monopolise and separate the prosecutorial and policing functions, particularly for serious crimes. In terms of policing, this meant that uniformed paramilitary police were preoccupied with the punitive regulation of the poor to the almost total exclusion of any interest in the constitution of markets and the just regulation of commerce, became one of the most universal of globalised regulatory models.
From the mid-19th century, factories inspectorates, mines inspectorates, liquor licensing boards, weights and measures inspectorates, health and sanitation, food inspectorates and countless others were created to begin to fill the vacuum left by constables now concentrating only on crime. Business regulation became variegated into many specialist regulatory branches (Braithwaite 2005, pp. 15-16 order, which prohibits a person from being involved in the management of a company for five years, as highly stigmatising and "gravely damaging to the reputation of a person thus afflicted". This would accordingly need to be taken into account in any subsequent criminal sentencing decision relating to the same misconduct.
Causation
One of the difficulties of teaching criminal law with a focus on a relatively narrow range of offences is that it implicitly paints a picture of the types of persons committing crimes. It will inevitably contain a 'disproportionate 
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Criminal law teaching can in part help inculcate a set of attitudes towards the legal system in society, exhorting in particular its legitimacy on the basis of its neutral nature, whilst ignoring the underlying structural inequalities of power which are imbricated in the cross-currents of society. The ideology of objectivity, egalitarianism and the strict application of rules can mask and mystify law's partiality, particularly its capacity to preserve and maintain the status quo for those in power (Horrowitz 1992, p. 266). As Norrie (2001) suggests: 'The cunning of the law lies in its ability to mask the one-sidedness of its instrumental content through its formal character as a logic of universal individualism' (p. 23). Hiding behind the 'false consciousness' of blackletterism are the variety of hierarchical interests that it serves. Apart from legal education (Kennedy 1990, p. 45) , this also has implications for legal practice, particularly the notion that what lawyers actually do is apolitical and independent, merely following the inner technical logic of the law. This might be reassuring, but it is a denial of the political and social realities of legal practice:
[B]lack-letterism works as a convenient mode of denial. It enables legal academics and lawyers to engage in what is a highly political and contested arena of social life -namely, law -and to pretend that they are doing so in a largely non-political way. The main advantage of this is that they can go about their daily routines without assuming any political or personal responsibility for what happens in the legal process. However, the insistence that lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate lawyers in any political process or demand from scholars a commitment to any particular ideology is as weak as it is woeful. Such an image is a profoundly conservative and crude understanding of what it is to engage in the business of courts, legislatures and the like. (Hutchinson 1999, p. 302) In addition to difficulties with the portrayal of criminal law as neutral and value free, criminal law teachers can, in excluding regulatory crime from the curriculum, implicitly construct a very narrow view of criminal typology, giving the impression that it is only certain socio-economic classes that commit crime.
The crimes of the powerful remain at the margin of attention. This is in spite of considerable change in criminological discourse in relation to White Collar
Crime and State Crime. Edwin Sutherland (1949) , for example, is reported to be the pioneer of white collar criminology. He suggested in the 1940s that white collar crime was 'a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation' (p. 9), thus challenging the stereotypical assumptions about all crime being committed by the lower classes.
He went on to note that the '…financial cost of white collar crime is probably several times as great as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the 'crime problem…' (Sutherland 1940, p. 5) . More significantly, Sutherland also emphasised the impact of such crime on society:
'The financial loss from white collar crime, great as it is, is less important than the damage to social relations. White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and produces social disorganisation on a large scale. Other crimes produce relatively little effect on social institutions or social organisation ' (pp. 11-12) . A key point for Sutherland was to emphasise the idea that white collar criminality was real criminality. It may not feature in debates about the crime problem or on the law and order agenda, but this was a mere labelling matter: '…white collar criminality differs from lower class criminality principally in an implementation of the criminal law which segregates white-collar criminals administratively from other criminals…' (ibid).
Paradigmatic Criminal Law
At a more technocratic level, many aspects of regulatory crime operate in opposition to the general trend of paradigmatic criminal law which permits general defences, demands both a conduct element and a fault element, and respects procedural standards such as a legal burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Pure doctrines of subjective culpability and the presumption of innocence are increasingly abandoned within this streamlined regulatory framework to make up for difficulties of proof in complex cases. The increasingly instrumental nature of criminal legal regulation is evident, for example, in the introduction of 'reverse onus' provisions that require the accused to displace a presumption of guilt. 8 The system of justice that applies in the regulatory realm is thus more exculpatory in orientation than its ordinary criminal counterpart. It is also evident in the instrumental fault element requirements of criminal regulation. The attachment of subjective mental element to wrongdoing in conventional criminal law is often severed in the regulatory criminal arena where objective standards of culpability apply. Aside from reverse onus provisions, the privilege against self-incrimination may also give rise to difficulties, particularly given the hybrid enforcement mechanisms that many agencies employ. This is something that Irish legislators are increasingly grappling with as regulatory practices become more embedded. Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 provides for an inclusionary approach to documentary evidence in criminal proceedings, this has not as of yet been extended to civil proceedings.
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In defining a crime 14 , the Irish courts have adopted a very traditional approach, emphasising indicia such as procedural characteristics (powers of arrest, detention, bail etc.), due process safeguards (the presumption of innocence, the right to liberty, the right to a jury trial), and punitive elements. As McGrath notes, these:
'…features are often associated with traditional criminal offences. This analysis has marginalised corporate criminality, often enforced by regulatory law, from the crime debate… [The Irish] cases speak to real crime so attempting to make conventional crime indicia fit into regulatory contexts is inappropriate. The jurisprudence needs to be re-evaluated and a new approach must be found.' (McGrath 2010, p. 60-61) Employing instrumentalist reasoning can also give rise to difficulties, particularly in relation to constitutional justice and due process safeguards. practices become more embedded, they are increasingly tested in the courts given their instrumental desire to maximise efficiency, enhance control and minimise risk. The flow of power into these civil and regulatory spheres is challenging for a due process system that emphasises the primacy of individual rights. The institutionalised nature of accused rights has ensured that they cannot be easily 'trumped for collective policy reasons such as risk management, security and public protection (Dworkin 1977, pp. 93-4) . They remain very much part of the topography in the Irish criminal process, carrying a 'threshold weight' 'which the government is required to respect case by case, decision by decision' (Dworkin 1988, p. 223) .
When due process and regulatory values and outlooks meet, as they increasingly do, it makes for an interesting battleground, a site for struggle and competing claims about security, instrumental effectiveness, governance, and liberal principles. These tensions are often however not captured in criminal law teaching which continues to perpetuate the myth of regulatory exceptionalism (usually in relation to strict liability offences only). The practice and operation of regulatory criminal law needs to be more fully embraced to highlight its growth and the tensions its creates for a traditional criminal law model rooted in an 1861 Offences against the Person conception of wrongdoing.
Information sharing and mandatory reporting
Current criminal law teaching often assumes that investigation and prosecution of any 'crime conflict' is the exclusive preserve of centralised police and prosecution force. Prior to this, the old system of law enforcement was heavily reliant on a network of rewards, victims, thief-taking and accomplice driven prosecutions. In an industrialised setting, this system of enforcement was increasingly viewed as a 'badly regulated system of power' (Foucault 1991, p. 79) . The state increasingly in the course of the nineteenth century began to monopolise investigative and prosecutorial functions, and to enforce the law on behalf of the 'people'. As much as possible recourse would not be had to local networks; where these practices continued -for example with informants -they were downplayed. The centralised state apparatus -as expressed through the police and public prosecutors -thus completely monopolised the crime conflict.
Commitment to this way of doing justice still informs criminal law teaching in reporters' (Horan 2011 (Horan , pp. 1529 (Horan -1540 . Auditors, tax advisers, lawyers, accountants and liquidators are all bound by various statutory requirements to report information to relevant authorities. 21 Very broad and generic obligations to disclose information have also recently been enacted.
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The difficulties of prosecuting regulatory crime are well documented. In addition to facilitating exchange of information and compelling certain parties to become information reporters, the authorities are increasingly also seeking to protect and encourage witnesses to come forward and provide evidence.
'Whistleblowers' have been crucially important in Ireland on lifting the lid on various abuses such as the care of the elderly and corruption in banks.
Encouraging such witnesses to provide information ordinarily takes two forms: involving the increasing 'regulation of civil society' (Crawford 2006, pp.449-479) . It stands in marked contrast to the traditional view that criminal law and prison isolates a small group who can be controlled, 'a delinquent milieu, closed in upon itself, but easily supervised' (Foucault 1991, p. 281) . Criminal law, under this style of governance, forms part of a 'hybridisation of techniques' (Rose 2008, p. 142) , that involve 'a multiplication of possibilities and strategies deployed around different problematisations in different sites and with different objectives' (Rose 2008, p. 240 ).
Conclusion
It is clear that the traditional preoccupation in criminal law syllabi with wellaccepted forms of criminal activity (e.g. assault, theft, murder, sexual offences), to the exclusion of regulatory crime, promotes a myopic vision of criminality amongst students. When students do not learn about regulatory crime alongside "real crimes" their understanding of regulatory crime as less harmful and less threatening is re-enforced. Given the available evidence of the threat posed to society by "systems risks" and the proliferation of regulatory offences in recent decades, a criminal law syllabus which focuses exclusively on traditional criminal offences fails to paint a complete picture for students. Moreover, their learning is fragmented as their understanding of this form of criminal activity is relegated to learning within commercial or company law context where the appreciation of this activity as a crime is lost. Particularly problematic in this regard is the failure to teach students how our traditional understanding of the structure of criminal offences (requiring conduct and fault elements), criminal defences and procedural safeguards differ when applied to regulatory crime. A departure from the traditional approach to exploring the contours of the criminal law is required, encompassing the broad sweep of offences and enforcement agencies and recognising the variegated approach to the detection, investigation and enforcement of offences in the twenty-first century.
